Hey Martin. Hey all on the thread. I like this one. Thanks for bringing it up. It outframes some of the thinking I can get limited in. This may be a bit rough, but here is my take on the issue: Cause and effect (as a law, or at least as a repeatable pattern about which we could generalize) with respect to a living perceptual system presupposes a repeatable event, but in most relevant instances, a repeatable event requires a repeatable context. This context is the "container" within which the cause, and then resultant effect, would occur. This is a prerequisite since the system (somewhere...) would need to "know" to have the same effect later as it had previously (in order to obey it's own law of C-E!?) It would do so by recognizing the same "cause" as in previous contexts. Since no two events are identical perceptually (i.e. at the level of FA, my presupposition here), the perceiver of the cause must mark a context within which the cause occurs and GENERALIZE (caps for emphasis.) But this generalization (that two or more causes are equivalent) is a function of the perceivers definition of context. So far it's ALL a function of the perceiver. Where's the C-E there! If the perciever marks the context differently, viola, same event becomes a different cause, an effect or who knows what since it's dependent on context. It's still all a function of the perciever. If we don't accept the idea that the repeatability of perceived causes is based on repeatibility of context within the domain of the perciever, then we are back to the fact that at the level of FA all events are unique. If all events are unique, then there is no C-E, just two singularly unique perceptual events that happen to occur at different times. There are counter-examples to this case of "all" events being singlularly unique, but they are all at lower levels of learning that could be labeled as hard-wired so as to live at the boundary of the "living/non-living" divide. Now, if a being marks contexts in such a way that they identify perceptual events that they generalize as equivalent to be causes of other events and commit enough neurology to this idea, they will be right. There will be cause-effect and they will prove it. In light of the above here is my quick response to two of your statements in this post: re: "How does the fact that there are a lot of leverage points in the process eliminate cause and effect?" It doesn't eliminate it, it just doesn't presuppose or require it either. re: "I just don't see how you suggest that living systems somehow escape causality, especially since you sustain the notion of an integrated body-mind." It is precisely the integration of body-mind that supplants C-E. Strictly non-neurological objects obey C-E. At least at the level of everyday experience. There's my take on this. I welcome follow up questions and challenges too. I am still working on verbalizing some understandings I appear to have (oh no!) so let me know if I have muddled it up enough for you ;-) Todd