Hello. From what I remember of WITW, 1.1 Dr. Grinder's & Ms. Bostic St. Clair write that Mr. Dilts levels do not satisfy constriction and inheritability requirements on objects sorted into logical levels. 1.2 For Dilts levels to be termed "logical levels" of Dr. Grinder's & Ms. Bostic St. Clairs logical type, Dilts levels must group objects into successive levels of decreasing numbers of objects, vertically sorting the objects at the Identity level into smaller and smaller sets. So, my question is, 1.3 what kinds of objects could be part of Dilts logical types "identity", "beliefs", "strategies", "behaviors", and "environment", that are objects that can be vertically sorted into logical levels? and my answers include, 1.4 a client's internal experience, or representation to himself, of his own problem's depedencies, could be sorted into logical levels. 1.5 a therapist's experience, or representation to herself, of her client's problems' dependencies, could be sorted into logical levels. 1.6 the objects "a client's identity-dependent problems", "a client's belief-dependent problems", "a client's strategies depedent problems", "a client's behavior-dependent problems", and "a client's environment dependent problems". The implications of [1.4] and [1.5] include, 2.1 a client could be representing his problems to himself, or discovering his own problems, to be problems related to, part of, affected by, or caused by, his own identity, beliefs, strategies, behaviors, or environment. 2.2 a therapist could represent her client's problems to herself, as if the client's problems are related to, part of, affected by, or caused by, the client's own identity, beliefs, strategies, behaviors, or environment. 2.3 a therapist could discover, a posteriori, that a client's problems are related to, part of , affected by, or caused by, the client's own identity, beliefs, strategies, behaviors, or environment. The question, 2.4 How can someone distinguish between what the client believes, what the client discovers is a posteriori truth, what the therapist believes, and what the therapist discovers is a posteriori truth? is worth asking.  My answers to question [2.4] would include the assumptions that, 2.5 a therapist might well accept, at face value, any model that describes a client's problems according to someone else's logical type sorting of those problems. 2.6 a client might believe that a therapist's logical types for the client's problems should be adopted by the client, as part of the client learning about the client's own problems. 2.7 asking the client, or therapist, whether (s)he believes in Dilts logical types "Identity", "Beliefs", "Strategies", "Behaviors", and "Environment" will not let you discover whether the therapist, or the client, has discovered objects of Dilt's logical types, or is simply assuming that such objects are correctly described by Dilts logical type description. 2.8 the therapist should be able to provide some evidence that a logical level sorting of problems into the levels "problems related to identity" -> "problems related to beliefs" - > "problems related to strategies" -> "problems related to behaviors" -> "problems related to environment" is valid. My assumption [2.7] entails that, 3.1 a person can assume that a full description for a logical type applies to the type's objects, when only part of the description of the logical type is known to apply to the type's objects. I wonder, 3.2 what parts of the full description of the logical types at each of Mr. Dilts' logical levels has Mr. Dilts checked for logical type description validity? I assume that valid logical type descriptions have the property that, 3.3 a complete logical type description applies to the objects intended to be communicated about, in any statement regarding the logical type described by the logical type description. To wrap up, 4.1 I propose Mr. Dilts types client problems, typed so that the client problems can be sorted into logical levels, logical levels of Dr. Grinder & Ms. Bostic St. Clair's logical type. My proposal [4.1] implies that, 4.2 a client's problems, according to Mr. Dilts formulation of client problems into logical levels, are often problems of identity.  A proper subset of problems of identity are also problems of belief.  A proper subset of problems of belief are also problems of strategies.  A proper subset of problems of strategy are also problems of behaviors.  A proper subset of problems of behaviors are also problems of environment. A question I have, when making this proposal [4.2], is, 4.3 What does Mr. Dilts consider to be a problem of identity, a problem of belief, a problem of strategy, a problem of behaviors, or a problem of environment? I believe, when I ask my question [4.3], that, 4.4 I, nj, am unfamiliar with Mr. Dilts logical types, particularly the types that he would term "problem of identity", "problem of belief", "problem of strategy", "problem of behavior", or "problem of environment", even if Mr. Dilts were to simply affirm that my proposal [4.2] is in fact correct. I am aware, when I ask my question [4.2], that, 4.5 Mr. Dilts may apply a nonstandard usage of the terms "identity", "belief", "strategy", "behavior", "environment", and "problem" in his discussions of logical levels and logical types. 4.6 I am assuming that for each "problem of client's ", the problems are in some way dependent on (related to, part of , affected by, or caused by), the client's , where "" can take the values "identity", "belief", "strategy", "behavior", and "environment". -nj