Topic: | Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:history and future history: Wittgenstein as influence - |
Posted by: | John Grinder |
Date/Time: | 03/04/2003 14:24:36 |
Michael First of all, while your ending statement, "If I got something wrong here, please donīt let me die stupid." is no doubt offered tongue in cheek (and is humorous), it fails to make a distinction that is absolutely critical (and is NOT made in some cultures. I refer here to the distinction between ignorance and stupidity. Being explict about what you are ignorant about is intelligent, and nearly a prerequisite for learning in order to fill that gap. Not knowing that which you are ignorant of is stupidity and an severe obstacle to learning. 1. You offer a reference to a manifesto in which key members of the Vienna Circle propose the behaviorist program for psychology - that is, how logicial positivism should impact the field of psychology. This document (do you have a web reference that would allow all of us to appreciate the statement made) demonstrates MY ignorance about where the behaviorist doctrine originated - thank you for correcting my ignorance before I die. 2. You write, "As far as Chomskyīs theories are empirically testable, only these structural properties do matter. So I think you can be a good transformationalist and still be a logical positivst. Iīm not exactly an expert, but I donīt know what revolution Chomsky brought that made logical positivism obsolete." The logical positivists (to my knowledge) held a sequence of positions on where to draw the line between activities that qualify as science and those that do not. At various times, we offered various formulations for this distinction. For example, one strong version offered was that unless there was a sensory grounded referent for the object or process under investigation, it was outside the domain of scientific questions - it might be art, or religion... but not science. On this criterion, I find an incompatibility between Chomsky's insistence, for example, that the data set to be explicated by the syntactian, again for example, was not the actual utterances of the native and fluent speakers of the language under investigation but the intuitions that native and fluent speakers have about the various syntactic structures in their language. But such intutions (while reliable both within an individual as well as accurate across individuals) have no sensory correlate and are therefore intangible and by the criterion mentioned above outside the realm of scientific activity. This is the sense of incompatibility that I intended. What do you think? John |