Hello to all, Since the notion of mind is to me continuous (analogical) in nature, mind is demonstrated and evidenced by degree.  The noun ‘mind’ could be viewed as a nominalization of what is to some the process of an autonomous agent deciding what to DO next.  A similar argument could be made for the notion that the classification of ‘body’ is also continuous (analogical) in nature and that the question is not whether or not something “has a body”, but to what degree is it embodied, which could be viewed as an ongoing process.  The noun ‘body’, when viewed in this light, could be seen as a nominalization of the ongoing process of embodiment.  The mind-body problem, when de-nominalized, is transformed into (or could be argued to be) a process distinction.  Within the context of  my developing understanding of the notions of ‘mind’, ‘body’,‘mind-body problem’ and 'map-territory distiction', I do not see the map-territory distinction as being an extension of the mind-body problem.  I might even argue that the ‘territory’ does not necessarily exist until I move within the world and take action within it.  I might further argue that ‘territory’ is merely an abstraction which happens to have been highly useful to maintain while endeavoring to explore the unknown and to later refine maps/ models of it.  However, this notion of ‘territory’ is accurately depicted as non-sense until it is actually explored.  Only then is the notion of territory stripped away and the unknown embodied.  Is it not epistemologically unsound to presuppose the existence of ‘territory’?  Map and territory, like context and content and perhaps even the distinction between substance/form and process/content, might be usefully viewed as mutually specifying one another. “…Which came first, the world or our experience of the world?…Varela et al. propose an illuminating analogy.  As one follows the flight of a bird, which comes first,  a movement of the eyes or the registering of an image?  Well, there must be an image of a bird flying before I can move my eyes to follow it.  But I must move my eyes to a position to register the bird’s image before that can happen.  Ah, it seems impossible to say.  It’s the chicken or egg problem, each seeming to have the other as a prerequisite.  Or, we might say, each mutually specifying the other, the image specifying where to look, the action specifying what image is seen.” (p.381) Franklin, Stan (1995) Artificial Minds “…As for any autonomous agent, my sensorimotor apparatus specifies my world. Note ‘sensorimotor’ rather than just ‘sensory’.  Could I fly, or swim deep and long in the sea, my world would be quite different.  But the world out there also specifies stimuli to my senses and constraints to my movements.  These stimuli and constraints become part of my world.  And I, as any autonomous agent must be, am myself a part of my world and am specified by it.” (p.381) Franklin, Stan (1995) Artificial Mind “Perception and  action, sensorium and motorium, are linked together as successively emergent and mutually selecting patterns.” (p.163) Varela, F.J.; Thompson, E.; and Rosch, E. (1991) The Embodied Mind With the greeting of seasons, -Pete West