Topic: | Re:Re:Please, correct me if I am wrong. |
Posted by: | Caefu |
Date/Time: | 08/11/2002 19:27:46 |
Dr. Grinder, Let me see if this stirs anything up. Since the meta states model is a generalization -- metastates, rather than *a* metastate -- I believe it would perhaps be impossible create one specific sensory-based description for all, but in the particular, M Hall offers his take on the phobia process: http://www.neurosemantics.com/Articles/phobia.htm To summarize, if I have a phobia of bees then: 1) When I hear or see a bee or bees my heart rate increases, my hands sweat, my vision blurs and I lose my sense of balance, which is a reaction to my internal representations of a revivified past memory, which I am associated to. This is a primary state. 2) When I dissociate from that memory, I am creating a different set of representations, in which I am seeing myself react in the above state. This decreases my perspiration and my heart rate, etc.. You might call this a third position move, but Michael calls it a Meta level move, because the representations he argues are "about" the previous state: a meta state. The rest follows this logic more or less. I don't know if I agree that states can me about states. That gets a little fuzzy for me. But I can go with the idea of a meta-representational continuum, which seems to be ubiquitous to my experience. If a "state" can be defined as a set of simultaneous representations, then it might follow that a state can be about a state. Does the secondary state include all that the primary state does? I have no way to contest this, but it seems that this is where deletion and generalization takes place, so I would say no. I might also contest the idea that meta-level states (images of myself being frightened of bees) can control primary states (ie external: perspiration, buzzing, images of insects flying, and internal traces of the pain I had experienced when I saw a bee stinging me), though something parallel to this is hinted at in "Turtles," when you ask the *controller* of a part or strategy that has been reframed to make sure that part does what it has committed itself to doing (may be a confusion in logical typing on my part). I might argue that the secondary state, seeing myself afraid of bees, was a dissociation, but did not produce the dissociation and therefore did not control the state. What did produce the dissociation? I wouldn't call it a state, though it IS perhaps the controller you were talking about. Maybe for Michael it is the highest level meta state, the one no other state is conscious of. best, C |