| Topic: | Re:Re:Re:Re:Please, correct me if I am wrong. |
| Posted by: | Caefu |
| Date/Time: | 11/11/2002 15:10:06 |
|
Yes, Michael, I agree that the pattern used in my/M Hall's explanation was coded years ago. I was just using it as an example for the sake of providing a sensory-based model. I am not in absolute agreement with him about his "model," and somewhat feel he has over-emphasized it's significance, but I DO, however, believe it is useful, and adds flexibility to the previous models. When I say I am in a state that is meta to another state, it directs my attention differently than if I have perceptually repositioned myself. I would say it specifies the relationship between first and third position, and gives intention to the specific third position I put myself in. It's useful to use such language when dealing with what M Hall calls "run-away" states. If I am not only afraid of bees, but even more afraid of how I will respond if I come in contact with bees, I have implicitly built a meta state, or a representation about a representation which might be more troubling than just being afraid of bees. On the other hand, I might be humored by my anxiety over bees. Michael explicates the fact that making this difference isn't simply a two dimensional state-shifting strategy, that it happens on different logical levels. Eliminating the fear on the primary level doesn't mean that I won't reinstall it because I'm still afraid I might be afraid. That's implicitly why double dissociation works when single dissociation often doesn't. I believe this distinction adds a new dimension to NLP patterning which can be useful in many ways, at least as a thing to keep in mind. I don't know if it's as revolutionary as the Neurosemanticists have made it out to be, but I'll give credit where credit is due. best, C |