Topic: | Re:Difference in beliefs as a case of differences in perception |
Posted by: | nj |
Date/Time: | 04/05/2004 00:41:51 |
Hello. I've been introduced to the philosophical study of value, by a book entitled, "General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest", authored by Ralph Perry (Professor Emeritus at Harvard), and published in 1954. On page 132, Dr. Perry writes about intrinsic value: "We judge a thing to be intrinsically good 'where we judge, concerning a particular state of things that it would be worthwhile - would be 'a good thing' - that that state of things should exist, even if nothing else were to exist besides, either at the same time or afterwards. If a thing derives value from its relation to an interest taken in it, it would seem impossible that anything whatsoever should possess value in itself. But in that case value would seem always to be borrowed, and never owned; value would shine by a reflected glory having no original source." Dr. Perry's definition of intrinsic goodness can be considered in light of some distinctions drawn by Searle in the book "Construction of Social Reality", regarding epistemic and ontological subjectivity and objectivity. I recommend "Construction of Social Reality" to you; the book is a good read and contains many useful distinctions. Applying my understanding of the Searle's distinctions AND my understanding of Dr. Perry's stipulative* definition of intrinsic value: - intrinsic value is an epistemically subjective property of an ontologically objective thing. -nj * I've not read most of Dr. Perry's book. His actual definition of value might not be what I quoted in this post. |