This is taken from> (Which goes on to propose its own model/version) http://www3.mistral.co.uk/bradburyac/nlpfax7.htm Logical Levels? Given the frequent assertion Dilts' models are based on or developed from Bateson's work, it seems reasonable to expect that Bateson's model of "logical levels of learning" and Dilts' "logical levels" should have certain significant features in common.  But they don't.  On the contrary, they differ in every important respect: Bateson was describing logical levels of learning.  Dilts' model is simply labelled "logical levels" - there is no explanation of what the models are logical levels of. One correspondent has suggested that they are "logical levels of intervention".  This would only be true, however, if it were also true that the "levels" represent a genuine hierarchy so that "intervening" at one level would effectively resolve related problems at lower levels.  This is not the case, however. as we will now see. If a model shows logical levels then there should be some kind of logical relationship between the various items.  There is in the Bateson model, but not in the Dilts model.  The logical relationship in the Bateson model is recursive - each level 'contains' all instances of the next level down.  For this to be true in the case of the plain Logical Levels model, for example, "Behaviour" would have to be the set of ALL "Environments"; "Capabilities" would have to be the set of ALL "Behaviours", and so on.  This is clearly not the case Bateson's model describes genuine "levels".  That is to say, there is an inherent hierarchical relationship between the items.  Dilts claims that his model has an "internal hierarchy in which each level is progressively more psychologically encompassing and impactful."  Unfortunately the claim falls apart in an instant in the face of even the simplest question, such as: In what sense is the "environment" a description of a psychological level? Obviously the Bateson model of "logical levels of learning" has nothing to do with Dilts' "logical levels", and Dilts' models are therefore not a development or extension of Bateson's work.  In fact, the "logical levels" and "neuro-logical levels" tags appear to be nothing more than a misguided attempt to give the models some semblence of academic/intellectual respectability by association. Neuro-Logical Levels? We need do no more that examine the labels of two of the elements in the "neuro-logical levels" model to realise that it is hopelessly flawed because it blatantly contradicts simple physiological facts. According to the "Neuro-logical Levels" model, the Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) is three levels higher than the Peripheral Nervous System (PNS).  For this to be true the ANS should in some sense "bring a deeper commitment of neurologogical 'circuitry' into action than would the PNS.  Unfortunately, as we can easily discover from any relevant text book, this description just doesn't make sense. Far from containing the PNS, the ANS is part of, or contained within the PNS.  Moreover, as Professor Donald Hebb puts it: The autonomic nervous system is ... a primitive, though still complex, set of motor pathways to smooth muscle and glands.  [it is] a primitive motor system, much of whose action is diffuse rather than specific and not well controlled by cortical systems." On what possible basis, then, can we suppose that the ANS brings "a deeper commitment of neurological 'circuitry' into action" than the "Motor system" (which it is part of), or the PNS (which it is part of)?  The neuro-logical model is clearly sheer psycho-babble, and has been constructed (for whatever reason) with a total disregard for reality.  Moreover these are only a few of the many flaws in the models, so representing them as useful models of reality merely demonstrates to outsiders the apparent gullability of the many NLPers who, in cult member-like fashion, swallow this stuff hook, line and sinker.