Hello, KC. In this post, I use the ellipsis symbol "...", to show a deleted portion of the posts I quote. In the post that this post replies to, you wrote: "Hello John Grinder and Carmen Bostic ...On page 276 you mention the following: NLP is characteristically defined in popular writing books as the study of subjective experience - indeed, there are a number of books on  NLP.....where this description occurs. But consider the phrase subjective experience---What could this possibly mean? Is it INTENDED TO CONTRAST WITH OBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE(surely an oxymoron) or what? JG and CB you go on to write: We have argued in the epistemology presented in Chapter 1, Part 1, that first access (FA) IS A PONT AT WHICH WE EXPERIENCE THE WORLD AROUND US. But FA is a point in the human neurology by definition at which the incoming data stream from the world has already passed through the initial series of the neurological transforms (f1). Since these neurological transforms are known to change the data that streams through in their movement to FA,the representations at FA are, BY DEFINITION, SUBJECTIVE-HAVING BEEN OPERATED ON BY THE STRUCTURE (the neurological transforms) of the human nervous system yet defined. Thus again, either the expression (subjective experience) is absurd- in this case, confusingly redundant or is being used pedagogically as a code to provoke certain understanding in the participant." In the post that this post replies to, you wrote: "So my quick question is where do you guys see   subjective experience beginning?" I think  Dr. Grinder & Ms. Bostic St. Clair see subjective experience beginning at the point of First Access (FA). In the post that this post replies to, you wrote: "How can one  change their variables to subjective see, hear and sense something other than they what they have previously if such redundancy does exists subjectively in each and every one of us especially if one has not defined such variables personally?" which I interpret to mean: "How can one change their internal sensory experience if one is subject to F1 transforms, given that the variables of internal sensory experience are not personally defined by the person who experiences the data at First Access?" That product of my interpretation presupposes that: "The variables of internal sensory experience are not personally defined by the person who experiences the data at First Access" "First Access data and internal sensory data are contradicting descriptions of internal sensory experience." Correct my interpretation to match what you meant, if my interpretation is incorrect.  Other interpretations also fit what you wrote. I evaluate the presupposition: "First Access data and internal sensory data are contradicting descriptions of internal experience." to be false, in the case that the internal sensory data are what the authors term "mental representations". I evaluate the presupposition: "The variables of internal sensory experience are not personally defined by the person who experiences the data at First Access." to be true, if F1 transforms all data experienced at First Access, and if personally-defined internal sensory experience solely consists of mental representations. In the book "Whispering In The Wind", on page 29, the authors  Dr. Grinder & Ms. Bostic St Clair write: "We are asking you to note that language further transforms representations of what we perceive and that these resultant perceptions result in a different logical type of mental maps - mental representations.  Those of you experienced in NLP-applications will recognize the importance of mental representations in respect to change work." After interpreting and evaluating the quote above, I believe that the authors of "Whispering In The Wind" use the term "mental representations" to refer to: 1. internal sensory data 2. a possible portion of the instantiated variables of a person's experience 3. internal experience that is not the product of F1 transforms 4. internal experience that is not experienced at First Access 5. a product of F2 transforms 6. internal experience that includes nonlanguage data 7. internal experience that is changable using NLP-application methods Furthermore, I believe that the variables of a person's internal experience can be changed using NLP-application methods.  If you believe the same, you don't need to worry about whether you can change your variables.  Your own experience of the efficiacy of NLP-application methods should prove that you can change your variables. -nj