| Topic: | Re:Heterarchy |
| Posted by: | nj |
| Date/Time: | 05/01/2004 03:09:59 |
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Hello, Amilcar. You wrote: 1. "Let me analogize this 'heterarchy' idea with a basketball team.[...]In the proposed heterarchy of Dilt's levels, all factors (identity, environment, etc) do play a role in the game, but at different times and for different reasons." I interpret you to mean proposition [2], below. 2. "The logical types of objects termed 'one's own spirituality', 'one's own identity', 'one's own beliefs', 'one's own strategies', 'one's own behaviors', and 'one's own environment' may play different parts, or no part, over some periods of time during one's own behaviors." If [2] is true, then: 3.1 one's own behaviors are not occuring during noncontiguous times of one's life. and 3.2 one's own behaviors play a part at all times of one's life, in one's life. and 3.3 [3.2] contradicts [3.1]. therefore 3.4 [3.1] is false. therefore 3.5 one's behaviors are always occuring during one's life. 4.1 If behaviors are always occuring during one's life, then one's strategies are always in execution during one's life. and 4.2 [3.5] therefore 4.3 one's strategies are always in execution during one's life. [2] can be revised, given your acceptance of conclusions [3.5] and [4.3]. [5], below, is a revision of [2]. 5. "The logical types of objects termed 'one's own spirituality', 'one's own identity', and 'one's own beliefs' and 'one's own environment' may play different parts, or no part, over some periods of time during one's own behaviors." A question for you is [6], below. 6. Does Dilts think that the logical types that he terms 'one's own spirituality', 'one's own identity', and 'one's own beliefs', only occur as BEHAVIORS of oneself? If your answer to [6] is 'yes', then I think that Dilts would definitely disagree with your heterarchy model. Another question is [7]. 7. Do you think that the logical types that you would term 'one's own spirituality', 'one's own identity', and 'one's own beliefs', only occur as BEHAVIORS of oneself? If your answer to [7] is 'no', then you could argue for proposition [6]. Below are descriptions of beliefs, identity, and spirituality that I accept. And I would accept others, too, if you want to argue for proposition [7], or proposition [2]. 8. A concept that one holds to be true about oneself, the world, or one's interaction with the world, is a belief. 9. An identity is a name for one's body. 10. A spirituality is either: 10.1 a set of behaviors that one performs during noncontiguous periods of time (such as weekends attending church, or smiling) OR 10.2 a characteristic of one's behaviors (such as the morality of one's behaviors) OR 10.3 a behavior that is constant during one's own spirituality and that is performed at all times by one (such as emitting a golden aura). If you asked me: 11. Do you think, nj, that the logical types that you term 'one's own spirituality', 'one's own identity', and 'one's own beliefs', occur as behaviors of oneself? I would answer, 'no', not in the case of beliefs. It's true that the act of believing can be said to be a behavior, but product of believing, a belief, is abstract from any agent, regardless of what agent the belief mentions. I think that a person performs behaviors continuously while he is alive. For someone to felicitously perform a behavior, that person must only be alive. For me, intention, cognition, and consciousness are not necessary conditions for the presence of behavior. I think so because I wouldn't want to write that someone in a coma is not performing a behavior. That person is behaving, ceteris paribus, even if the person is in a coma without intention, cognition, and consciousness. -nj |