| Topic: | Re:Re:Heterarchy |
| Posted by: | Amilcar |
| Date/Time: | 06/01/2004 00:00:01 |
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NJ: thank you for your input. However, i was not assuming, nor do i have the notion that i was talking about behaviors. I was talking about thoughts (yes, a specific type of behaving). When i was questioning whether something can be classified under two of Dilt's 'logical levels' i was referring more specifically to whether a thought/statement is classified according to its content (insert reflective gasp! here). trying to clean that up, i may think that Dilt's model deals with content in that it tries to explore the relationship(s) between different kinds of content, albeit abstract relations between logical types as in 'environment' and 'behavior' versus perceptual relations in terms of prepositional phrases. Could this be a kind of syntax of the belief system and not the sentences themselves? Okay, that's overdoing it. Example: in terms of the thought/statement "i will go to the store" we have notions of identity-I, belief-will, capability&behavior-go; and environment-store. This is the kind of thinking that i am thinking of (but it seems that i wasn't talking about) instead of your interpretation that i was thinking/writing of behavior. If a person performs the behavior of going to the store, then i think that Dilt's 'logical levels' would be moot and irrelevant, as i agree with JG & CBSC when they say that the domain of NLP covers representations, i.e. not behaviors. Unfortunately, it seems that my basketball metaphor wasn't successful in explicating the relationship between the actions/behavior of the players and the thoughts of the logical levels. I was trying to get across the notion that just as a player in a game can perform behaviors classified in the domain of different players (point guard in a jump-ball instead of a tip-off) so can a thought be classified under two of Dilt's 'logical levels' (see my reply to JG, the example of "i can X"). I'm sorry that i wasn't explicit enough about this point to keep you from mixing the content of the metaphor with the structure of my argument - i.e. you thought i was talking about behaviors. In reference to your propositions in general: Sorry that i'm not perceptive enough, but i don't find a meaningful difference between proposition 6 and 7. Nor would i argue for either proposition 6, 7 or two because i wasn't talking about behavior/behaving, i was talking about thought/thinking. I would like to respond to my own hypothetical question :) to which you reply "It's true that the act of believing can be said to be a behavior, but product of believing, a belief, is abstract from any agent, regardless of what agent the belief mentions". To this i would smirkingly ask: could you point to me a belief that is abstract (separate?) from a believer? I'd smirkingly ask this because if i'm not mistaken that this would be a violation of the meta-model distinction lost performative. But in the context of me pointing it out it's really a rhetorical question and point, please don't respond to it. Amilcar PS: i'm starting to think this whole argument is moot since i realized i may thinking about 'content' and not 'structure'/'process' as some of my issues/questions revolve around Dilt's 'logical level' classifications and not the process of classification itself. . . Homeresque "Doh!" |