In discussing WITW and New Code (NC), I would like to address the topic/critique of M.H. in WITW and his model of Meta-States/Neurosemantics. Publicly, some have hailed it as an extension of the originial NLP Old Code (OC); not the least of which, M.H.. In contrast, others have tenaciously asserted that Meta-States(MS) is not what the author purports it to be and, further, that M.H. should re-think what he hopes to achieve by carving out a new chunk of perception in our proverbial maps. In discussing MS in this forum as it is critiqued in WITW, the learning strategy many contributors have used is to delete and exclude information that doesn't fit within their maps. What I would suggest is to continue the implied learning contrast, but be entertained by the thought of a new adventure. Turn off your filters for acceptance or denial then test for the usefulness of the information only in the spirit of the exploration of subjective experience. Now, in WITW, John and Carmen suggest that a alleged MS is nothing more than a 3rd perceptual position (3PP) revisited. And that while interesting, neither of them espouse how that the 'proliferation' of multiple MS would be useful. While I partially agree, I would first suggest that a MS is very useful, but *only* so in light of its formal codification as 3PP and utilized in the context of the initial NLP process of modelling. In fact, my hallucination is that the ongoing debate over MS might be a catalyst for the more explicit codifying of 3PP which previously was lacking in OC. If we begin with MS being equivocal to 3PP, then several interesting questions emerge: 1. What is the nature of 3PP? What exactly is it? 2. Is it meta to 1st and 2nd? Does it exist as a higher logical level, same logical level or lower logical level? 3. Does it influence 1PP or 2PP? In what way? 4. Does 3PP have a connection to 1PP or 2PP; more than a previously explicated visual disassociation (Phobia, Timeline, etc.)? 5. Is it the source of evaluative perception of 1PP and 2PP? If so, wouldn't this be the domain of modelling beliefs/values/decisions (any of MH 'logical level distinctions) within a 'experience triad'? As a final note, what I find particularly interesting in addition to the above questions is distinction between a belief and a emotional state. For example, I *assume* that a belief can only be expressed in an auditory digital structure. Further that such a belief would exist as a cause/effect or equivocation between criteria/value. Therefore wouldn't 'tenacious assertion' (supra) simply be the value of assertion having met the critieria of tenaciousness. If so, wouldn't the MS/3PP of criteria of tenacity simply be applied to the initial emotion state of assertiveness for modelling and give us a way to chunk emotional states more precisely as they connect to the realm of beliefs? This explanation helps explain, to me at least, how MS proliferate to form a gestalt in the same way we have all known beliefs to connect to larger contexts and larger contexts. In other words, the beliefs connect to a 'greater' gestalt; not the states as a MS. And they do so using a foregrounding / backgrounding mechanism. Let's start here... -Gene