Ryan Yeah, I'll take a piece of that! Beautifully framed work - you set a fine standard. The contrast between the two cases you offer is very instructive. There are two differences I would like to comment on: 1. In case 1 (the Feldenkrais exercise), the perceived sensations - as you state you are not perceiving your foot - only transforms of differences that define what the state of your foot was some milliseconds ago. These differences are transformed by your neurology in as yet unexplicated ways and presented to you at FA (firest access). You correctly point out that in the context of this exercise and given your skill and background training, it is quite easy to be conscious of the FA representations - specifically, those transforms of difference between your foot and the floor. Please note that this focus (on the foot) has the usual cost - it requires most of your 7 + or - chunks of consciousness to appreciate the transforms of the differences that correspond to the intricacies of how your body is responding to the difference between your foot and the floor. One cost, for example, is your failure (consciously) to note the transforms of the differences that correspond to the contraction of the abdominals as you rock or those of the neck muscles stabilizing your head during the rocking motion or those of the automatic tracking of your eyes maintaing an apparent fix on the horizon as you rock... Your question/proposal remains, "Do we need to make a further distinction of First Access that does not make it to f2 (i.e. conscious/linguistic mappings)?" I suggest a slight re-wording - instead of "make it to f2" I would say "is not subjected to f2 mappings. In any case, there are two historical proposals, each of which captures a distinct aspect of what you are pointing at: 1. in the 4-tuple proposed by Bandler and me in the '70s - - each of the variables (visual, auditory, kinesthetic, olfactory/gustatory) has a subscript (possibly a superscript) that can take one or both of two values "e" for external and "i" for internal. In the Feldenkrais case, the foot example would have a kinesthetic component with an "e" subscript indicating the contact point between the floor and your foot. The second case - the image of your dissertation (tor)mentor - in which the image (while perfectly FA) never achieves consciousness although critically its influence can be detected in your subsequent behavior - again the value of the subscript for the V variable will reflect an "e". In Pattern of the Hypnotic Techniques of Milton H. Erickson, M.D., volume II, Bandler, Delozier and me introduced various operators defined over the 4-tuple. In particular, the C operator is an operation that selects from the various values of variables that comprise the 4-tuple (equivalent to FA in Whispering as Carment and I mentioned in a footnote) those elements that end up in our consciousness. This can occur with or without f2 mappings as the two examples you offered instantiate. All of this seems to be a somewhat awkward way of saying that experience (FA) can be unconscious or conscious, and that in either case, it will exert influence on behavior. Further, it is useful to make a distinction where the influence is coming from: that is, is it entirely internally generated or is that something lurking out there that is somehow associated with this particular FA. All the best, John