Ryan Your quote from Bateson is I would propose, isomorphic to the task we have at hand, namely: "to create the beginnings of an appropriate theoretical base for the describing of human interaction"  (Bateson in the preface to The Structure of Magic part 1 R Bandler/J Grinder. Example We create a map but fail to include the mapmaker So we step back (to 3rd position!) and from that point of view we make a map of the map and the map maker. Then we realise we have created another map maker so we take a step back ... and so on ad infinitum. John You misquote your own work.. The C operator as defined in Patterns 2 stands for congruency.  The R operator defines that which is available consciously, the L operator defines that which is (immediately) available unconsciously.  By the way these chapters in Patterns 2 are I believe key to linking in the theoretical basis of NLP to the framework of cognitive science and the broader epistemological debate.  But as presented they are horribly ill defined as a model. I've brainstormed some missing elements of the 4 tuple as a necessary and sufficient theoretical model viz { I shall use the following conventions <> defines a list of elements V= visual A=Auditory K=Kinesthetic O=Olfactory G=Gustory [] = "optional" i = internal e = external t = tonal d = digital } //////////////////////////////////////////////// 1) The 4 tuple or FA represented as each element in the list is the product of a function (the transforms of the nervous system).  These functions are not defined.  In particular *internal/external- it is common use to use one or other superscript, however FA contains both simultaneously, the choice of superscript points to the bit WE are interested. *Each rep system has its own unique code- we need to include the submodality distinctions in the model *Each rep system will share a common F1 "logic" or patterning and will also exhibit distinct patterning relative to other rep systems. *We have no way of specifying "chunk" size within the model. *We have no way of specifying constructed as opposed to eidetic So while we have an abstract way of talking about that which is available at first access we have no clear definition of what first access is, it is simply a convenient verbal description at the moment. ////////////////////////////////////////////// 2) The function Ad().  As defined in Patterns 2 Ad is the language function, the creation of an f2 representation. So "a specific symbol string" =Ad( Please note AT THIS STAGE WE HAVE NOT INCLUDED CONSCIOUSNESS. I propose (and John you may understand this in the context of Andy Clark's paper if you have had time to absorb that) that language as a part of our thinking has to arrive there like everything else through First Access- Time2 (<[V[ie],A[ie],K[ie] >)= Time1(Ad()) So our first access to the results of the function Ad could be INternal kinesthetic -we feel our hands forming the words or our throat muscles moving external Auditory - we hear what we just said or someone else says internal auditory - we hear internally ditto internal visual- we remember a word or sentence, we create one, we see words in a dream. external visual- obvious I hope. ///////////////////////////////////////////////// 3) The function R() As presented in patterns 2 this is "the preferred representational system", that which is consciously represented. Given that "the validity of a representational system diagnosis is not more than 30 seconds" (J Grinder, inspiritive interview)  further definition of this function would include: *What is the method of selection of the current conscious representational system? *How does the limitations of consciousness relate to chunk size. what function determines chunk size? These are fundamental questions about "the spotlight of attention" Any attempt to explicate this function will I propose have to include a recognition of the "self" or "I" as an f2 socially mediated construct internalised as an f1 model and in an ongoing act of creation. //////////////////////////////////////////////////// 4) The function L() As presented in Patterns 2 this is "the lead system" or that part of our experience which influences our behaviour that we are not conscious of. By now I think it should be clear that we have no operational definition for this function. we can use the calculus to describe experiences such as the ones Ryan mentions and we can use it as a useful pedagogical device as you do in Patterns 2 John but I think it would be a really interesting exercise to begin to relate this nomenclature back to some neurophysiology and some robust introspection. In conclusion I wish to return to something you said Ryan. you wrote: "1. I am lying on the floor doing a Feldenkrais lesson. With my knees bent and my feet on the floor, I am gently rocking my left leg back and forth. Occasionally, I will push my foot into the floor. I am not directly perceiving my foot am I? Any sensation, any feeling, that I have of my foot, no matter how direct it may seem, is simply news of a difference. The sensation itself is a transform of an event, not the event itself. The feelings I perceive of my foot are First Access, yes?" While what you write is one way of describing what is happening I think you are mistaking the map for the territory.  Language is so imbedded in our thinking that we forget that it immediately introduces boundaries that do not exist.  Take the sentence "I see the flowers"  the structure of language introduces and imposes a subject "I" and an object "the flowers".  I challenge you in First access to discover that there is only "the process of seeing" "First Access" is a boundary, a line drawn in the sand that has no phemonological existence.  As soon as you say "I feel my foot" you have created a boundary between yourself and your foot which does not exist.  There is only the process of feeling.  I challenge "you" to go in search of "you" without getting lost in infinite recursion!!!! Robin Manuell www.ideasinmotion.co.uk